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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WYCOFF CO:JIPANY, INCORPOR-
ATED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and ROY HILL, djbja 
SEA!fONS TRU·CK LINE, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cases Nos. 
7 409 and·7 4.10 
While we substantially agree with the plaintiff's 
. statement of the evidence relating to the hearing on the 
cases involved, we are not in accord with plaintiff's 
conclusions with respect thereto. We will therefore 
give our version of that part of plaintiff's statement 
of facts which is controverted by the defendant. 
In referring to the record, the defendant will cite 
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the page num·ber at the lower righthand corner. 
The contract entered into hy the Northwestern 
Express Company, Inc. with D. W. Harris, Manager 
of the Orpheum Theatre, Tremonton, Utah, on April 7, 
1947, was executed prior to April 24, 1947, when the 
alleged rights of the said Northwestern Express Com-
pany, Inc. were reinstated by the Public Service Com-
mission. The plaintiff never did receive authority from 
the commission to provide service under this agreement 
(R. 147, 148), nor is there any evidence in the record 
that the plaintiff ever served D. W. Harris under said 
contract. 
There was no reason to notify the Northwestern 
Express Company, Inc. or its principal stockholder, 
Milton Wycoff, of the hearing on defendant Hill's appli-
cation to serve the Liberty and Orpheum ·Theatres on 
Apri116, 1947, as at that time not only had the contracts 
previously held by the Northwestern Express Company, 
Inc. ceased to exist, but the rights of the company, if 
any, had not been reinstated. The date of the reinstate-
ment order was April 24, 1947. Said company had not 
been in operation since January 27, 1944. 'There were 
no protests filed by plaintiff to either the Public Service 
Commission's order of July. 9, 1947, authorizing service 
to said theatres by the defendant Hill, or to its order 
of January 9, 1948, authorizing the defendant to serve 
the Main Theatre in Garland. If plaintiff felt that by 
not having received notice of said hearing his rights 
were infringed, his remedy was to protest to the com-
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mission and demand that the issues be formally heard. 
This was never done. 
The lease between ilielba H. Seamons and Roy Hill 
provided that the operating rights of the Seamons 
Truck Line should he leased to Roy Hill (R. 93). It is 
correct that at the time of the execution of said lease 
the operating rights were ''contract rights.'' However, 
the agreement provided that all operating rights obtain-
ed by the lessee, Roy Hill, should revert to the lessor. 
The parties interpreted this clause to refer to any 
rights acquired by Hill during the term of the lease, 
whether contract motor carrier or common motor car-
rier. ~[elba Seamons, the lessor, testified at the hearing 
in support of the defendant's application (R. 106-107). 
The application of the defendant filed on May 21, 1948, 
for common motor carrier authority (R. 1, Case No.7 410, 
Vol. 2) states that "applicant is an individual operat-
ing under the name and style of the Seamons Truck 
Line. Contract carrier rights are leased from Mrs. 
~[elba Seamons,'' which dilly apprised the commission 
that he was applying as the lessee of said contract 
rights. 
While the defendant was serving the Orpheum 
Theatre at Tremonton and the Main Theatre at Gar-
land, pursuant to authority from the commission, ,the 
ownership of these theatres became vested in the Allied 
Theatre Company, of which change the defendant had 
no notice until he received a demand from Milton Wycoff, 
president of the plaintiff corporation, to give him the 
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keys to the theatres because said company had a con-
tract from said Allied Theatre Company. At the time 
the Allied Theatres had been in existence "a couple 
of months" (R. 154). 
The contract obtained by the plaintiff provided 
that he would carry double feature fihns for $2.50 (R. 
155), which was 50c cheaper than the defendant had 
carried such film (R. 52). When the defendant learned 
of the plaintiff's contract he secured a new contract 
from Jorgenson, president of the Allied Theatres Com-
pany, wherein he agreed to carry double feature film 
at the reduced rate of $2.50 in order to meet Wycoff's 
rate ('R. 54). 
The application of plaintiff for common carrier 
authority over regular routes from Salt Lake City, 
Utah, to the Utah-Idaho line of U.S. Highways 91 and 
89, serving the off-route points of Lewiston and Hyrum, 
covered the territory in which the defendant Hill was 
serving every theatre with the exception of two which 
were government owned (R. 39). It is interesting to 
note that not one theatre owner from this territory or 
the 'Tremonton-Garland area appeared at the hearing 
in support of the plaintiff's application for contract 
motor carrier authority or common motor carrier au-
thority. 
On pag.e 10 of his brief the plaintiff quotes testi-
mony of the defendant Hill from the record to show 
the lack of need for a common carrier. The following 
testimony on this point should he considered, with the 
testimony quoted: 
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"Q. Now, at the time you obtained temporary 
authority to operate as a contract carrier 
for the theatres in Tremonton and Garland 
in 1947, was any one else delivering film 
to those theatres at that time besides the 
Express Company? 
"A. No. 
'' Q. And your application as lessee of Mrs. 
Seamons' operating rights is to serve as a 
common carrier all the same people that you 
are now serving as a contract carrier~ 
"A. That's right. 
''Q. Which will increase your responsibility to 
the public and subject you further to the 
jurisdiction of this Commission~ 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. In a sense you have been operating as a 
common carrier heretofore, have you not~ 
''A. Contract carrier. 
'' Q. I say, in a sense you have been operating 
as a comm·on carrier~ 
"A. That's right. 
'' Q. In that you have been serving all the 
theatres in the district in which you propose 
to operate~ 
"A. That's right." 
Mr. McMahon, who appeared in support of plain-
tiff's application was only one of twelve or thirteen 
film distributors operating in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 
130). His testimony in substance was that there were 
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times when it was necessary to send out film to theatres 
on special trips; that on these occasions he had used 
the Wycoff Company and also the defendant Hil'l (R. 
130). His testimony on the type of service furnished 
by the defendant Hill is quoted verbatim as follows: 
"Q. Have you had occasions in times past to have 
Mr. Roy Hill make special trips for you~ 
"A. I believe Mr. Hill made a trip for us last 
week to Tremonton. 
"Q. And has Mr. Hill ever refused to make a 
special trip for you~ 
''A. Never at any time. 
"Q. Have you been satisfied with Mr. Hill's 
service in the past for your company~ 
"A. He has done a very good job ancl he has 
made mistakes, like everybody else has made. 
'' Q. Have you ever had any eomplaints of Mr. 
Hill's service in any of the theatres~ 
"A. Not any definite complaints. He has had 
mistakes happen. 
"Q. And Mr. Wycoff has had his~ 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And by and large, Mr. Hill has done a very 
good job for you~ 
''A. That's right.'' 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's contentions, as set out in his statement 
of points, must be considered in the light of Section 
76-6-17, U.'C.A. 1943, which provides that the findings 
and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact 
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shall be final and shall not be subject to review. It has 
repeatedly been held that in reviewing cases certified 
to the court from the Publie S~rvice Commission, t~e 
review is limited to ascertain whether or not the com-
mission had before it substantial evidence upon which 
to base its decision, and that only in the event that the 
commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreason-
ably, can the order be set aside. Goodrich v. Public 
Sen·ice Commission of Utah, 198 Pac. (2d) 975. 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE COMMISSION'S 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT MOTOR 
CARRIER APPLICATION TO SERVE THE TWO THEATRES 
INVOLVED. 
The defendant had satisfactorily served the Orpheum 
Theatre at Tremonton under a permanent contract car-
rier permit since July 9, 1947, and had served the Main 
Theatre at Garland under permanent contract authority 
since January 9, 1948. Before these dates he 'Served 
both theatres under temporary permits issued by the 
commission and was so serving said theatres when 
Milton Wycoff, president of plaintiff corporation, ob-
tained a contract from the Allied Theatre Company 
by cutting the prices . for double feature :fihns from 
$3.00 to $2.50 per change (R. 54). When Jorgenson, 
the president of the Allied Theatres Company, learned 
that Hill would meet Wycoff's rate, he gave Hill a 
contract (R. 51), indicating that Hill's service had been 
satisfactory. It is significant that Jorgenson did not 
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appear at the hearing in support of plaintiff's appli-
cation. 
The pJairitiff's claim for authority was based upon 
contract permit No. 241, issued the Northwestern Ex-
press Company, Inc. in 1939, wherein the commission 
granted authority to serve contractees who were man-
aging the three theatres at that time. These contracts 
had long ceased to exist. The theatres were under a 
different ownership when the defendant started serving 
them. It is the defendant's contention that when the 
contract ceased to be in effect, the authority of the 
plaintiff's predecessor to serve the contractees ceased, 
as there was no further reason for the authority. Plain-
tiff's contention that the reinstatement order of April 
2'4, 1947, reactivated the right to serve theatres in 'Tre-
monton and Garland really amounts to an assertion 
that a contract carrier's authority is as extensive as 
that of a common carrier. If plaintiff's position is cor-
rect, the result would be to make every contract carrier 
a common carrier, with the right to select only those 
customers whom he would serve and to refuse to serve 
the public generally. Such a situation certainly would 
not henefit the general interest of the public in efficient 
service. The common carrier, being left with only the 
unprofitable part of the service, would soon be out of 
business. 
It is interesting to note that although the plaintiff 
contends that it is not necessary to petition the com-
mission to serve new contractees after a permit has 
once been granted, that in this case he did exactly that 
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'r. 
by filing his petition for contract authority. Also, why 
did plaintiff obtain a new contract with the Allied 
Theatres Company if he felt his rights under the old 
contracts were still in existence¥ The commission's 
order of April 24, 19±7, reinstating the rights of the 
Northwestern Express Oompany, Inc., merely reactivated 
those rights still existing and permitted the defendant 
to operate over the same routes and with the same 
restrictions. Undoubtedly this company had other rights 
under suspension which the plaintiff acquired when the 
assets were purchased, but the commission could not 
reinstate rights based on contracts that were no longer 
in existence. 
There is no evidence of other contracts secured by 
plaintiff with the parties who operated the theatres 
covered by the original contracts fil_ed in 1939, after said 
reinstatement order of April 24, 1947, as contended on 
page 16 of the plaintiff's brief. The commission by its 
order denying the plaintiff contract carrier authority, 
merely decided that the defendant should continue to 
serve the same two theatres of the common carrier that 
he had served in the past as a contract carrier. There 
are only three theatres to be served in the Garland and 
Tremonton area, and the commission, by its order, 
determined that the interests of these theatre operators 
could best be served by one common carrier than by 
two contract carriers. If plaintiff's petition to serve 
two of the theatres had been granted, the defendant still 
would have heen required to serve the one theatre that 
had not contracted with the plaintiff, the result of which 
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would compel him to serve the same territory with a 
two-thirds decrease in the available business and result-
ing loss of revenue, which would eventually cause de-
fendant to discontinue entirely his service to the Tre-
monton and Garland area. 
The commission, in the interest of the general public, 
may regulate contract carriers to the same extent as 
it does common carriers (Sec. 76-5-24, U.C.A. 1943). 
In the case of Goodrich v. Public Service Commission, 
supra, this court refused to set aside an order of the 
commission denying the carrier authority to serve four 
additional contractees who appeared at the hearing 
in support of the carrier's petition, upon the ground 
that such would result in financial loss to the existing 
common carrier, to the detriment of the welfare of 
the public in the area to be served. This decision is 
also authority that a contract carrier is not authorized 
to serve additional contractees upon securing a contract, 
but must also petition the commission for authority to 
furnish such additional service. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION ACTED LEGALLY IN GRANTING 
COMMON MOTOR CARRIER AUTHORITY TO THE DEFEN-
DANT, WHO WAS LESSEE OF THE OPERATING RIGHTS, 
AND MELBA SEAMONS. 
There is nothing in the Utah statutes defining the 
power of the Public Service Commission stating that a 
lessee of contract authority cannot apply for common 
carrier authority. The commission permitted the defen-
10 
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dant to lease the operating rights of :.Melha Seamons 
under a five year contract on April 15, 1947. There was 
some attempt at the hearing on the part of plaintiff 
to becloud the issues by asserting that Roy Hill was 
applying for common carrier authority in his own name, 
to the detriment of the lessor, :Jfelba Seamons. However, 
this contention was answered when Mrs. Seamons ap-
peared as a witness in support of her brother's petition. 
The lease contract between her and the defendant is no 
concern of the plaintiff. The only issue before the 
commission was whether or not granting common carrier 
authority to the defendant was in the public interest, 
which it decided in the affirmative. Mrs. Seamons stated 
that she favored the granting of defendant's petition 
(R. 106-107). At the end of the lease, if it is not re-
newed, this authority would revert to the lessor, subject 
to the approval of the commission. The public is ade-
quately protected by the statutory power of the com-
mission to revoke the operating rights of any carrier 
when the public welfare requires it. 
The evidence established that the commission was 
within its authority in granting defendant's petition 
~ to operate as a common carrier. Granting that plaintiff 
g is correct in its assertion that there were no witnesses 
{: who testified on the need for a common carrier, there 
were also no protestants, other than the plaintiff, who 
.. were interested as a petitioner for the same authority. 
The situation here is different from that in McCarthy 
v. Public Service C01nmission, 184 Pac. (2d) 220, wherein 
the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 
11 
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an existing common carrier, protested the granting of 
common carrier authority to a number of independent 
truckers, who had previously operated as contract car-
riers of gravel. In this case the evidence is conclusive 
that the defendant served every theatre in the territory 
which he proposed to serve as a common carrier, other 
than two government owned theatres (R. 39), whereas 
plaintiff served no theatres in this territory (R. 151). 
There were no complaints on service from any shipper 
served by the defendant. The only witness who appeared 
at the hearing was Mr. McMahon, and his testimony 
was as favorable toward the defendant as it was toward 
the plaintiff (R. 131). At the hearing Mr. Wycoff did 
say that every exchange manager in Film Row would 
testify in support of his petition (R. 140), hut Mr. 
McMahon was the only one who appeared. 
The principal reason the plaintiff gave in support 
of its contention that it was 'better qualified to operate 
as a common carrier than the defendant Hill was that 
it had more trucks operating than defendant; that it 
operated five regular schedules north out of Salt Lake 
City, Utah in interstate commerce; that occasionally it 
was necessary for plaintiff to make special trips to haul 
film to territories served by the defendant; however, 
Mr. Wycoff had no records of such special service ('R. 
171). The defendant Hill testified that he was in a 
position to make special trips when necessary and had 
done so in the past ( R. 89). 
Defendant contends that under the situation exist-
12 
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ing, wherein he was satisfactorily serving every theatre 
as a contract carrier in the territory, which he petitioned 
to serve as a common carrier, that the general 
public is better served by him as a common carrier than 
as a contract carrier. As a common carrier he has a 
mandatory duty to serve the public generally instead 
of just those individuals with whom he has contracts. 
Also, as a common carrier, he must submit to more 
detailed tariff regulation by the commission, which is 
in the public interest, particularly when his operation 
serves every privately owned theatre in northern Utah. 
There is very little difference in the requirements 
to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity to 
operate as a common motor carrier (see Sec. 76-5-18, 
U.C.A. 1943) and the requirements to operate as a con-
tract motor carrier (see 18ec. 76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943, as 
amended by Section 3, Chapter 105, page 209, Laws of 
Utah 1945). In the former, the commission must he 
satisfied with the applicant's financial ability to render 
this service. In the latter this requirement is lacking. 
There was no claim by plaintiff that defendant's 
financial ability to serve as a common carrier was insuffi-
cient. Therefore, it would seem that if the defendant 
were qualified to act as a contract motor carrier, that 
he was qualified to serve as a common motor carrier and 
the commission felt that the public would benefit, if he 
were granted common motor carrier authority. The 
evidence was that the plaintiff had forty-two trucks, 
thirty-eight to forty-two employees, and carried nearly 
13 
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all the film from Salt Lake City to Southern Utah (R. 
138, 139). Granting it common carrier authority in 
Northern Utah would result in plaintiff orbtaining a 
virtual monopoly on the carriage of all film in the state 
of Utah, which, we submit, is not conducive to the best 
interests of the public generally. 
Mr. Wycoff's contention that his company desires 
authority only to serve theatre owners in Northern Utah 
in time of emergencies is a subterfuge by which he hopes 
to eventually take over the operations of the defendant. 
If plaintiff's petition for common carrier authority is 
granted, the defendant can expect the type of competi-
tion shown by plaintiff when he cut-rates to the Allied 
Theatre Company to obtain a contract from it. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant respectfully submits that there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain the order of the 
commission granting common motor carrier authority 
to the defendant and denying the petition of the plaintiff 
for such authority, that the order of the commission 
denying authority to the plaintiff to operate as a con-
tract carrier to the theatres in Tremonton and Garland 
should likewise he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON 
AND E. F. BALDWIN, J1R., 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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